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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the evolution of political finance reform debates in Malaysia, one of the world’s 
most durable electoral authoritarian regimes. While the reliance of the dominant party, UMNO, on 
unfettered resources remained unchanged, crises in Malaysia’s political environment allowed civil 
society actors to concretise abstract debates over reform into specific proposals. Drawing from 
interviews, public statements and observation, two distinct periods in this reform debate are analysed: 
after Najib Razak assumed power in 2009, following the unprecedented electoral success of the 
opposition during the 2008 general election; and after the 1MDB scandal broke in 2015. In both 
periods, civil society actors took advantage of new political dynamics to present specific proposals for 
political finance reform. These proposals laid the groundwork for government-led reform 
recommendations, though key provisions were excised that would curb UMNO’s power. Reform 
efforts stalled when the government resisted deeper reform while opposition parties offered little 
support for the proposed changes. This article reviews an under-researched area of policy interactions 
in electoral authoritarian regimes involving not just the ruling party and the opposition, but also civil 
society. A postscript considers the trajectory of this debate following the 2018 national elections 
which toppled UMNO from power. 
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Ruling parties in electoral authoritarian regimes have access to considerable financial resources to use 
towards their political goals, one of the key reasons they are able to maintain power. This access is 
often guaranteed by the laws and institutions governing political finance: broadly, all money earned or 
spent by parties and candidates during and apart from electoral campaigns (Norris and Es 2016). But 
the ability of ruling parties to structure political finance regulations in their favour, and to subvert or 
ignore regulations when necessary, does not insulate them from political crises and pressures to 
reform issuing both from within the party as well as outside. How do regimes respond to political 
crises brought on by their own political finance practices? What role do opposition parties and civil 
society play in advocating for reform while engaging in government-led and biased policy processes? 
This article examines the evolution of the political finance debate in Malaysia through the actions of 
the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), opposition parties and civil society. 
UMNO maintained its dominant position in governments since independence in 1957 and until 2018, 
governing after 1974 through the Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front) coalition. One key part of 
this longevity was a political finance regime that has allowed UMNO access to significant resources 
while effectively restricting the opposition from doing so. But UMNO’s unbroken tenure in power 
was marked by repeated debates over the control of money for elections. This article analyses two 
such debates: after substantial gains were made by opposition parties in the 2008 general election and 
after 2015, when public revelations about the misappropriation of money from 1Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB), a government-linked company (GLC), catapulted the issue back into 
the headlines. The article traces the public pronouncements and actions by three different actors: the 
dominant party UMNO, the opposition parties and civil society. It highlights the role of civil society 
in advancing debate beyond vague calls for reform, even as government politicians retreated from 
deeper reforms and opposition parties remained reluctant to participate. 
The first period analysed begins after the unprecedented wins of opposition parties in federal and state 
elections in 2008 and the installation of a new Prime Minister, Najib Razak, in 2009.1 These shifts in 
political winds prompted several new developments. Banking on an image as a reformer, Najib 
introduced several new initiatives with the stated aim of curbing patronage and rent-seeking and 
reforming the financing of politics (see Malaysia 2010a; NEAC 2010). But the proposed changes 
garnered little public support from UMNO members. Opposition parties also remained sceptical about 
these reform efforts, given their perception that the reforms potentially further entrenched the ruling 
coalition. Najib himself quickly shifted away from his reform commitments, and in the effort to regain 
footing lost during 2008, the 2013 elections saw unprecedented levels of campaign spending.2 
Nevertheless, civil society actors managed to advance the debate on political financing by providing 
actual proposals over how reform could take place. 
The second major period analysed occurred after 2015, when political financing returned to the 
spotlight with the unveiling of the 1MDB scandal. The scandal linked missing money from 1MDB to 
the deposit of RM2.6 billion (approximately US$700 million in 2015) into Najib’s personal bank 
account (Wall Street Journal,March 1, 2016). The funds from this account were allegedly used during 
the 2013 general election (Wright and Hope 2015). In response to these allegations, Najib formed the 
National Consultative Committee on Political Financing in August 2015. The Committee’s members 
were only to deliberate the tenets of a new law; no institutional reforms were to be considered, nor 
was the 1MBD scandal to be reviewed. More than a year later, the Committee issued a series of 
reform proposals based on previous civil society recommendations, but with key provisions removed. 
While BN politicians publicly endorsed the Committee’s proposals, civil society groups pointed out 
the lack of certain regulations. The opposition remained reluctant to support the reform proposals, 
centring their rejection on the fact that the 1MDB scandal was not addressed by the Committee. But 
opposition parties did not articulate alternative reform proposals. This put them at odds with civil 
society organisations supporting political finance reforms. 
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The interactions between the dominant party, opposition parties and civil society are significant in 
understanding currents of reform and entrenchment in political finance. While much scholarly 
attention has focused on describing UMNO’s political finance regime, the findings of this study 
suggest that attention to actors both within and outside the dominant regime are important to 
understand sources of change. The findings suggest that in Malaysia, civil society played an important 
role in crystallising policy debates in ways that forced politicians both within the government and the 
opposition to respond. This article thus demonstrates the complex lines of debate that arise from 
conflicts within the government itself, the opposition parties and civil society in participating or 
boycotting government-led (and biased) reform efforts. 
To put our arguments into context, this article first reviews the work on political finance in dominant 
party electoral authoritarian regimes like Malaysia. We then discuss the impetus behind calls for 
political finance reform in Malaysia that began during the reformasi period in 1998 and document the 
incomplete reforms pushed by two successive prime ministers, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib 
Razak. The study then turns to the debate, after the 1MDB scandal broke, and explains the dividing 
lines between different actors over how or whether political finance needs reform. 
 
Political Finance in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
A key source of the staying power of long-running electoral authoritarian regimes, particularly those 
featuring a dominant authoritarian party – such as Malaysia’s UMNO and Singapore’s People’s 
Action Party, as well as Taiwan’s Kuomintang and Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
before their fall from power – has been their reliance on unevenly enforced or lopsided rules of 
political finance (see Hu 2011; Templeman 2012; Peschard 2006). Dominant parties use access to 
state resources to fund campaigns for internal party elections as well as general elections, including 
direct monetary inducements to voters, as well as rent distribution through patronage and clientelist 
ties. Control over and access to finances enable ruling parties to dominate the electoral playing field 
and limit the ability of opposition parties to raise the resources necessary to compete effectively 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, 11; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 120). 
Formal institutions governing political finance are varied. Malaysia’s largely unregulated system of 
political finance undoubtedly benefited the dominant party, but did less to explicitly target the 
opposition through formal regulations. This stands in contrast with similar regimes, which have 
adopted clear rules that disadvantage the opposition. Singapore, Malaysia’s neighbour to the south, 
adopted a strict regulatory approach to political financing to help entrench the power of the ruling 
party (Ufen 2015). That government’s Political Donations Act, passed in 2000, restricted anonymous 
donations, a rule that the opposition Singapore Democratic Party argued was a way for the ruling 
People’s Action Party to effectively cut off their resources, given the threat that donors would be 
pressured or punished by the state (Chee 2000). At the same time, Singapore’s regulations ban 
donations from foreign sources, trade unions and charitable groups, but allow companies with partial 
state ownership or contracts with the government to make unlimited donations (Ufen 2015, 581). A 
similar law in the dominant authoritarian regime of Tanzania, the 2010 Election Expenses Act, allows 
unlimited contributions to candidates and parties but requires donors to be identified, a move decried 
by the country’s opposition politicians (Arriola 2012, 250). 
However, this literature has tended towards static descriptions of political finance regimes as a 
mechanism of authoritarian durability. On the one hand, political finance regulations are another tool 
in the “menu of manipulation” used by incumbent governments to hold on to power (Schedler 2002). 
But where does change to such systems come from? In some cases, efforts and pressures to reform 
political finance may issue from within the ruling government or dominant party itself. Yet ruling 
governments may also face pressure, brought on by successful opposition party challenges or 
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economic crisis, to introduce political finance reforms. While it is true that “any [political finance] 
reform could be manipulated to lock in a ruling party’s advantage” (Arriola 2012, 249), shifts in the 
broader political environment may provide the genesis for change. The Mexican case illustrates this 
paradox. During its long period of dominance, Mexico’s ruling PRI introduced reforms initially meant 
to control the opposition and allow the party to hide state resources it appropriated for its own ends. 
But apparently wary of the party’s reliance on state resources, the PRI government pushed through 
reforms that banned donations from state agencies in an attempt to “wean” the PRI from its 
dependence on the state. The PRI also privatised state enterprises, increased public financing and 
introduced stricter political finance regulations – all of which contributed to a levelling of the electoral 
playing field (Greene 2007, 114). These changes were followed by electoral reforms that further 
levelled the playing field for the opposition. Importantly, the opposition parties were able to use their 
wins at the ballot box to negotiate further reforms to the electoral system: After the opposition party 
PAN scored major electoral wins in the late 1980s, they negotiated reforms that included an 
independent electoral commission, including an independent electoral commission, that ended up 
severely constraining fraud by PRI in subsequent elections (Magaloni 2008, 244). 
Of course, formal changes to political finance regimes may only partially regulate hidden or illicit 
sources of finance. Even as the formal financing regime grew tighter, parties, especially PRI, raised 
enormous sums off the books. At one point, PRI raised an estimated 20 times the legal limit for 
campaign finance for its electioneering activities (Levitsky and Way 2010, 158 fn 345). Greene (2007, 
114) notes that the opposition also took advantage of illegal foreign funds prior to winning the 
presidential election in 2000. But cumulatively, these dynamics suggest greater attention to the 
strategic interactions and conflicting incentives of different actors in authoritarian societies. It is 
unclear from existing scholarship how ruling governments manage conflicting pressures of reform or 
maintenance of political finance regimes and how opposition parties interact with ruling governments 
over changes to political finance; nor does this literature deal with the role of civil society actors in 
reform debates of this sort. 
In particular, the pursuit of political finance reform creates a dilemma for the opposition and civil 
society. Opposition parties may have a normative, as well as instrumental, interest in lessening the 
systematic financial advantages of the incumbent regime. As some scholars argue, only when 
opposition parties have access to the resources previously enjoyed just by ruling parties can they 
compete effectively (for example, Arriola 2012). Yet, changes to political finance regimes, without 
accompanying institutional reforms, may leave opposition party practices open to greater scrutiny, 
disadvantaging the parties in the short term even though these changes may lay the basis for genuine 
reform in the future. Civil society actors, too, face choices in the extent to which they participate in 
government-led policy processes, thus providing legitimacy to the government’s efforts, or staying 
out of the process. In the following sections, we trace these conflicts through these political actors in 
Malaysia’s recent history. 
 
Political Finance in Malaysia 
Before turning to the recent history of reform debate, we briefly review here Malaysia’s political 
finance regime and the formidable challenges to introducing reform. Several works have described the 
structure of political finance and the funding sources of its major parties (Gomez 2012; Ufen 2015; 
Weiss 2016). To summarise the most important features of Malaysia’s political finance regime as 
currently practiced: unlimited anonymous donations to parties are allowed; political parties can own 
businesses; and the ruling parties benefit from the network of GLCs that make up a substantial portion 
of Malaysia’s economy (Gomez et al. 2017). Party finances are largely hidden; while political parties 
must submit audited financial reports to the Registrar of Societies each year, the public does not have 
access to these reports (Transparency International 2010). These dynamics explain why the funding of 
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politics has continued to be opaque, loosely regulated and skewed to benefit the incumbent 
government (Ufen 2015). 
Yet issues concerning political finance go deeper than the lack of regulations, given the tight links 
between the main political parties of the ruling coalition and business (Gomez 2009). Malaysia’s 
government is highly interventionist, holding control over a vast segment of the corporate sector with 
a huge presence in banking, construction and media. GLCs are a crucial source of patronage and even 
a covert source of funds, as recently demonstrated by the 1MDB scandal. Despite the restructuring of 
ownership and control of the leading public-listed GLCs since the 2000s, they can still be used for 
patronage (Gomez et al. 2017). These links have incentivised private businesses to ally themselves to 
the ruling elite (Gomez 2009). The leading quoted GLCs are led by trusted corporate professionals 
who are accountable primarily to the minister of finance – a post concurrently held by the prime 
minister, an issue of much public criticism. 
Access to resources were crucial to the ruling UMNO for two reasons. First, they allowed party 
leaders to deter exit and ensure the loyalty of party members, excluding the distribution of benefits to 
those seen as critics of national leaders or those who shift their support to the opposition. This has 
been seen in various episodes in UMNO’s history where patronage remained key for ensuring loyalty 
in the face of regime defectors (see Brownlee 2007, 139). Second, it allowed UMNO to pay party 
workers and to maintain support of the electorate through a variety of services. UMNO cemented the 
loyalty of voters by providing everything from public goods and services to small favours. During 
electoral seasons, an army of party members campaigned door-to-door and plastered everywhere a 
voluminous number of posters of UMNO, BN and their candidates (Weiss 2016). In villages, UMNO 
workers constantly visited voters at their houses and invited them to gatherings in the neighbourhood 
to meet the candidates. Allegations of votebuying and cash handouts were common, particularly in 
rural areas, though their prevalence is difficult to substantiate (for example, Bersih 2016). This style 
of intensive and continuous campaigning required substantial access to funds. 
The main opposition parties – the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the People’s Justice Party (PKR) 
and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) – historically relied on very different sources of finance, 
using membership fees, donations from supporters, compulsory contributions by sitting legislators and 
sales of their party newspaper (Gomez 2012). This limited the ability of opposition parties to engage 
in resource-intensive campaigning – such as patronage, promises of infrastructure development and 
direct vote buying – that BN had been able to engage in (Weiss 2016). 
Prior to 2008, the focuses of public attention and reform were largely oriented towards UMNO’s 
internal politics, as the party largely set the course for Malaysia’s politics. As UMNO’s sources of 
funding shifted, tensions over political finance and the distribution of rents became prominent. In the 
early 1970s, UMNO began seeking new sources of funding to lessen its financial dependence on its 
leading coalition partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association, a party led by wealthy businessmen 
(Gomez 2012, 1382). In the 1980s, UMNO’s membership shifted decisively away from its rural base 
to professionals and business people, increasing allegations of vote buying for elections as well as for 
internal party elections. The perception that the culture of patronage and corruption was corrosive to 
the party’s support sparked calls for reform (Case 2005, 143). Then Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad was eventually compelled to denounce the influence of money over politics in 1985 
(Gomez 2009, 5–7). Subsequent UMNO presidents spoke of the debilitating effects of money politics 
on the party and the need to eradicate it, while implementing piecemeal reforms. Under Prime 
Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, for example, efforts such as reviewing government contracts and 
cracking down internally on corruption did not lessen the practice of money politics (Case 2005, 12). 
Those found guilty of buying support were not brought to criminal trial but sanctioned within the 
bounds of the party. While there was undoubtedly a public relations aspect to these pronouncements, 
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the heavily monetised aspects of UMNO’s politics likely did contribute to factional politics within the 
party and incurred costs on the party’s public image. 
The debate over political finance reform, especially in terms of corruption and money politics, rose to 
greater public prominence during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998. In the 1999 elections, the 
reformasi movement and opposition parties, comprising a large number of members of civil society, 
made broad calls for reform of Malaysia’s political institutions to reduce corruption and cronyism 
(Weiss 2005, 138). Yet, while the opposition coalition called for clean governance and transparency, 
as well as ending a patronage system that appeared to enrich only UMNO elites, there was little 
specifically said about what the reforms would look like (Weiss 2005, 146–147). The Coalition for 
Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih), a major non-governmental organisation (NGO), formed with the 
opposition parties, took up issues of electoral reform in 2006. However, the matter of political 
financing was not specifically raised. Instead, Bersih’s demands centred more on the transparent 
conduct of elections and avoiding electoral fraud (see, for example, Bersih 2008). 
The funding of DAP, PKR and PAS largely escaped public attention, in large part because they had 
little access to the funding sources enjoyed by the parties of the ruling coalition. The parties 
historically relied on membership fees, donations from supporters, compulsory contributions by 
sitting legislators and sales of party newspapers (Gomez 2012). As a result, opposition funding 
remained largely out of reform discussions. 
 
2008 Elections and Aftermath 
The 2008 elections brought to the fore the debate over political finance reform, as key issues that had 
emerged during the campaign included the rampant practice of patronage that had contributed to 
cronyism that was stifling domestic investment.3 As a result of the poor showing of UMNO in the 
elections, there was great pressure on the incoming Prime Minster Najib to publicly commit to a broad 
reform agenda. Najib, as the new prime minister in 2009, vowed to usher in an era of “transparency, 
democracy and the rule of law” (The Star, April 4, 2009). Najib made explicit calls for transparent 
and accountable governance, including through institutional and legislative reforms (see, for example, 
Rodan and Hughes 2014, 74). It appeared that the public regulation of political parties – not limited to 
UMNO – would finally make it into public debate. 
Najib introduced a slew of reform ideas dealing with a range of issues, including the financing of 
politics, reducing the state’s presence in the economy and bringing to an end selective patronage-
based affirmative action. In January 2010, he put forward his Government Transformation 
Programme, which included a promise to tackle “grand corruption.” As part of the programme, it was 
promised that a study would be conducted on “revamping political funding within the bounds of the 
constitution…. [including] the possibility of introducing an enhanced disclosure process, cap on 
private donations and supplementary public funding” (Malaysia 2010a, 24). Work began on political 
finance reforms under a new policy-based unit, PEMANDU, situated under the jurisdiction of the 
prime minister and run by private sector professionals. It began considering proposals to reform 
political financing. 
But, not long after, Najib retreated publicly on these key reforms. He reversed his decision to cease 
the policy of affirmative action – his revised proposal was “market friendly affirmative action” – as 
the political financing reform plan was quietly shelved and the government stopped advocating 
privatisation as a core policy objective (see Malaysia 2010b, 141–149). In part, Najib’s retreat 
reflected pressure from other parts of society not to institute major reforms that would undermine the 
existing system. The demands of these groups, particularly Persatuan Pribumi Perkasa (Perkasa), 
reflected discontent within UMNO. The patron of the Malay-based Perkasa was former Prime 
Minister Mahathir and the group’s primary concern was Najib’s intent to cease the policy of 
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affirmative action (see Chin and Teh 2015). There were also clear instrumental reasons for the party 
to avoid political finance reform. In 2012, in response to a corruption investigation involving RM40 
million received by UMNO’s Sabah branch, Najib stated that “we are not at liberty to disclose [the 
donation] because the opposition also receives donations and they don’t disclose” (The Star, October 
13, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Najib continued to voice his support for reform plans. In a speech to members of the 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) in February 2012, he stated that the agency would 
be used to investigate political financing. He argued that all contributions to a political party at federal 
or state level should be channelled through official party accounts (Funston 2016, 84–85). Instead, 
however, UMNO politicians sought internal regulations to improve the party’s performance and 
perception among the electorate, rather than broader public regulations. Najib eventually announced 
changes to voting within UMNO, specifically to reduce money politics by enlarging the eligible 
electorate for internal elections. But rather than eliminating money politics, the new system meant that 
patronage was distributed in ever-larger amounts to division heads and parliamentarians (Funston 
2016, 121). 
Money politics within UMNO continued. In preparing for the 2013 elections, Najib allegedly brought 
together party factions through financial rewards to reduce the factionalism seen as a factor in 
UMNO’s poor electoral performance in the 2008 elections (Welsh 2016, 230; Saravanamuttu 2016).4 
Inevitably, the UMNO president needed access to funds to service these patronage ties and shore up 
support. The amounts needed were high. Funston (2016) reported that Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a 
former UMNO vice president and minister of finance, disclosed that UMNO division heads and 
parliamentarians received RM50,000 per month or more. Despite the enormous expenses tied to intra-
party patronage, the distribution of this money was arguably imperative for UMNO leaders to build a 
support base that could be mobilised during general elections. 
 
Civil Society Efforts 
Despite the reluctance of Najib’s government to move forward on reforms, the results of the 2008 
general election spurred the creation of comprehensive and specific proposals to regulate political 
finance. Transparency International (TI)-Malaysia unveiled a 22-point memorandum on political 
financing reforms in May 2011 (Malaysiakini, December 9, 2014). Among other proposals, the 
memorandum recommended full public disclosure of the amounts and sources of party finances and 
expenditure, limits on political donations and the channelling of political contributions through party 
accounts rather than individual accounts. TI then initiated a project to review the financing of politics 
and to prepare relevant recommendations to eradicate processes hindering the conduct of fair 
elections. 
The TI proposals were presented to both opposition parliamentarians and members of the BN in a 
series of meetings in 2009 in parliament. At the meetings, attended by one of the authors of this 
article, the response was notably lukewarm.5 In a parliament roundtable with opposition politicians, 
the parliamentarians argued that full disclosure would hurt their contributors and consequently the 
financing of the opposition. They claimed that their donors would be harassed or prosecuted by public 
agencies should the opposition fare well during elections. In a subsequent meeting with TI, meeting 
minutes disclosed by a federal minister, Abdul Rahman Dahlan, outlined this reluctance in more 
detail: PKR’s Tian Chua stated that he “feared that full disclosure would hurt their contributors and 
consequently the financing for the opposition; the fear is that the donors might be prosecuted by the 
winning coalition for supporting the losing coalition in a general election. This would result in a 
substantial decline of income source for the losing coalition” (Dahlan 2015). Other opposition 
politicians also reflected a reluctance to pursue reform. For instance, in 2014 PKR politician Rafizi 
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Ramli argued that political financing legislation could be a “double-edged sword” for the opposition if 
it curbed some of UMNO’s practices but also penalised the opposition (Teoh 2014). 
A TI meeting to discuss reform recommendations with BN parliamentarians was similarly coolly 
received. The only person who turned up for the meeting was Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz, in his 
capacity as minister in the Prime Minister’s Department.6 During the meeting, Nazri acknowledged 
that general elections were free but not fair as political parties did not have equal access to funds. He 
stated his in-principle agreement with TI’s recommendations, including direct state funding of parties 
to reduce, or even halt, their dependence on business for money to run their campaigns; the 
prohibition of media ownership by parties and full disclosure of political donations. But Nazri, like 
the opposition, was unwilling to implement TI’s recommendations, even as Najib was then actively 
endorsing reforms including a Political Parties Act that would regulate the financing of politics. 
Nazri’s stated concern was TI’s recommendation that power be devolved to oversight agencies such 
as the Election Commission, the MACC and the Attorney General’s Chambers. He strongly opposed 
this recommendation at this meeting, even after TI argued that if his government wanted Malaysians 
to believe that public announcements about improving the financing of politics were credible, this 
devolution of power had to be instituted. 
The series of meetings ended without apparent take-up by the government. TI went on to publish a 
book on its proposed reforms, titled Reforming Political Financing in Malaysia, in 2010. In 
subsequent government plans, including the New Economic Model, the Economic Transformation 
Programme and the Tenth Malaysia Plan, the devolution of regulatory power proposed by TI was not 
recommended or instituted. Opposition parties did not present alternative plans for reform. At that 
moment, specific reforms of political finance mooted by prominent civil society organisations 
appeared stalled. 
 
Post-2015: Political Reform Debate Re-Invigorated 
Events in 2015 brought issues of political financing back to the public agenda. Early that year, public 
revelations about misappropriated money from the economic development fund 1MDB prompted 
international scrutiny and domestic outcry. Originally a state-level economic development fund 
established in Terengganu, 1MDB was reconstituted as a federal entity by Najib in 2009, who then 
assumed the position of chairman of the board of advisors. The development fund reached 
international fame after the Wall Street Journal (March 1, 2016) alleged that at least US$1 billion was 
misappropriated from 1MDB and channelled to Najib’s private bank account. This money was part of 
the at least US$3.5 billion that the US Department of Justice (2016) alleged was misappropriated by 
executives of 1MDB. 
Debate soon began over the source of the funds, with Najib stating that US$681 million of the money 
found in his bank account was a donation from Saudi Arabian royalty (BBC News, July 22, 2016). 
But regardless of the source, it was revealed that some of the money deposited into Najib’s account 
was reputedly channelled to politicians preparing for the 13th General Elections in 2013. Following 
another Wall Street Journal (March 13, 2016) article, Najib’s brother, Nazir Razak, confirmed that he 
had received approximately US$7 million from Najib’s personal account, with instructions from 
UMNO leaders to disburse it to UMNO politicians before the 2013 elections.7 
As the scandal reverberated in Malaysian politics, calls grew stronger to end anonymous flows of 
money for political finance. Even as domestic investigations into 1MDB closed or stalled as an 
apparent result of government pressure, Najib announced a plan to institute political finance reforms 
in August 2015. A cabinet-appointed committee, the National Consultative Committee on Political 
Financing (hereafter the Consultative Committee), was formed to draw up proposals that would 
inform the writing of a new political finance law. Najib announced that the Consultative Committee 
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would formulate reform plans and improvements to existing laws within the space of a year, before 
the GE14 election.8 To head the committee, Najib appointed Paul Low, a former president of TI. Low 
had been appointed by Najib as a minister in the Prime Minister’s Department after the 2013 election. 
It had been under Low’s leadership of TI that initial proposals for political finance reform were 
mooted. 
The timing of the Consultative Committee’s formation and scope of its authority invited scepticism 
from some actors. Lim Chee Wee, a member of MACC, stated that the Consultative Committee’s 
creation ordinarily would be applauded. “But … given the circumstances leading to Najib’s 
announcement it is seen by a large majority of Malaysians as an insincere move to distract [from] the 
perceived wrong of the alleged donation” (Ruxyn 2015). The Malaysian Bar Council declined to 
participate in the Consultative Committee for the same reason (Ruxyn 2015). The Consultative 
Committee’s purview also did not include assessing the institutional framework regarding elections, 
such as the Elections Commission and the Attorney General’s Office. Media statements by Paul Low, 
now acting as the head of the Consultative Committee, seemed to confirm that the looming 1MDB 
scandal would not be directly addressed. In one interview, Low acknowledged that he was aware that 
money had been channelled into the prime minister’s account, but the Consultative Committee had no 
jurisdiction to investigate this matter and Najib had no duty to explain this donation.9 
In response to the government’s failure to deal with 1MDB and the perception that funds from it were 
being channelled to UMNO, civil society actors attempted to push the new committee to concrete 
discussion regarding institutional reforms. Seventy NGOs, led by G25, a group of prominent and 
mostly retired Malay civil servants, submitted to the prime minister a proposal on political financing 
reform in August 2015 (The Star,August 16, 2015). The proposal, which also included 
recommendations from business associations, outlined reforms covering the regulatory and legal 
framework of political financing, ensuring autonomy and enforcement power for institutions and 
regulation of both general election campaigns as well as internal party elections. The report also 
argued that the public should have access to information about financial contributions to political 
parties and candidates, but the selective persecution of donors by the government would be explicitly 
forbidden. These proposals were submitted to the prime minister, who did not respond to a request by 
these NGOs to discuss the matter.10 
A year after its formation, in the wake of repeated demands by NGOs about the government’s promise 
to reform the financing of politics, the Consultative Committee released its recommendations in 
September 2016. It proposed the creation of a new statute known as the Political Donations and 
Expenditure Act (PDEA) to regulate all aspects of political financing, overseen by a parliamentary 
standing committee on political financing (see New Straits Times,September 30, 2016). The statute 
would ban state-owned enterprises and companies receiving government contracts and concessions 
from making donations. The Consultative Committee also recommended state funding for political 
parties, which justified full disclosure of income and expenditure across all different types of political 
finance, including internal party elections, electoral campaigns, party organisations and educational or 
charitable activities by parties. 
Many of the Consultative Committee’s proposals resembled those produced by the G25-led NGO 
coalition. However, as noted by the coalition in a subsequent press release, there were fundamental 
differences between the two (The Star Online, October 4, 2016). Significantly, the Consultative 
Committee proposed removing caps on donations to politicians or parties, legitimising unlimited 
amounts of money for political finance purposes. The NGO coalition contended that without 
institutional reforms, there was no guarantee that the opposition parties and their donors would not be 
unfairly targeted by the new statute. They also noted their concern that the Consultative Committee’s 
disclosure requirements could possibly hinder business donations to opposition parties if their donors 
had no guarantee that they would not be victimised. 
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The Consultative Committee was also silent on the issue of deeply monetised elections within parties, 
although civil society had long held that this issue had to be addressed in order to curb serious 
factionalism based on patronage and the inability of young members to move up the party hierarchy. 
Indeed, the reforms proposed by the Cabinet Committee hardly dealt with the core issues that needed 
to be tackled to curb the widespread abuse of money in the political system. Despite the watered-
down reform measures in the Consultative Committee’s recommendations, the timeline for reforms 
before the next election was missed. Although the government had proposed to have the PDEA statute 
in place before the 14th General Elections, due by mid-2018, Consultative Committee head Paul Low 
announced that the proposed law would not be tabled in parliament before the elections. Low said that 
the technical committee was still formulating the new act (The Sun, September 2, 2017). 
 
Opposition Response to Reform Proposals 
Although the 1MDB scandal had reinvigorated public awareness of political finance and demands for 
reform, the opposition parties appeared hesitant to sign on to government-led initiatives. Like 
previous proposals by the government to reform political financing, the opposition parties rejected the 
Consultative Committee’s recommendations. Not surprisingly, the opposition viewed Najib’s move to 
create the Consultative Committee as an attempt to deflect attention from the 1MDB scandal. DAP 
leader Lim Kit Siang, who had a long history of support for reform, argued that before talk of reform 
could move forward, Najib first had to “re-establish his moral authority to talk about transparency and 
integrity on political funding” by accounting for the missing 1MDB funds and the donation that went 
into his personal account (Lim 2015). The DAP and PKR declared that they would join the 
Consultative Committee to discuss the proposed reforms only if the 1MDB controversy and the 
RM2.6 billion foreign funds that had been channelled into Najib’s bank account were addressed (The 
Malay Mail, August 20, 2015). 
After the Consultative Committee’s recommendations were released, DAP Secretary General Lim 
Guan Eng issued a statement calling the proposals a “political gimmick” (Lim 2016). He criticised the 
proposed removal of limits on campaign spending, lack of asset declarations and failure to outlaw 
donations made directly into personal bank accounts of politicians. He also raised concerns about the 
impartiality of the office created to monitor party donations and expenditure (Lim 2016). DAP MP 
Ong Kian Ming, while praising some of the Consultative Committee’s recommendations, raised 
concerns about the independence of the proposed creation of a new office to which all parties must 
report donations, which has the power to audit and even ban parties from participating in elections if 
they violate disclosure rules. Ong noted that if the head of this office responded to pressure from the 
government, like other public oversight institutions, then it could well become a tool against the 
opposition (Ong 2016). 
Government officials and UMNO politicians sought to portray the reluctance of the opposition to 
support political finance reform as self-serving. In an article in the online news portal, 
Malaysiakini,cabinet minister Abdul Rahman Dahlan argued that the DAP had opposed reforms out 
of self-interest and kept its own sources secret while demanding transparency about UMNO’s 
financing (Malaysiakini, July 31, 2015). The head of PEMANDU, Idris Jala, argued that:  
Since 2010, we tried hard to convince both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat to accept our 
recommendations … in 2014, when for the second time our Prime Minister had called for the 
regulation of political financing, senior Barisan party members argued that to be fair, it should be 
implemented in tandem with Pakatan. We felt positive about this because at least one side (Barisan) 
accepted our proposal and the other side, Pakatan may perhaps have been keen to jump on this 
bandwagon given their stance on governance and transparency. Again, we ended up with no voluntary 
takers (Jala 2015). 
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In August 2015, as opposition parties stated the need for a reckoning with 1MDB before political 
finance reform could be discussed, Jala criticised “the trickery to lay conditions and requisitions … 
only backpedals efforts and holds ransom the solution towards transparency and accountability in 
political financing” (Jala 2015). 
There were ample reasons to fear that the government-led reforms would harm the financial base of 
the opposition. Opposition parties reported that potential donors worried about harassment if their 
opposition links are revealed (Interview, opposition party treasurer, Kuala Lumpur, March 22, 2016). 
In this regard, Stanley Thai Kim Sin, a prominent businessman who actively campaigned for the 
opposition during the 2013 elections, merits mention. Following the election, Thai encountered 
serious problems from the government; he was subsequently charged with insider trading in 
December 2014 (The Star, December 15, 2014). By 2016, Thai was publicly declared that he had 
simply been a “vocal” citizen during the 2013 elections, denied any involvement with the PKR-linked 
Institut Rakyat and said he did not endorse any opposition party (The Star,May 28, 2016). Mandatory 
disclosure of donors would presumably discourage potential contributors who fear retribution. 
But, while rejecting the Consultative Committee’s recommendations, the opposition did not offer an 
alternative position on political finance reform. This is noteworthy given the demonstrated capacity of 
the opposition to prepare detailed statements and positions on important issues. The opposition had 
built capacity through a variety of party-linked think tanks, such as the Institut Rakyat and the Penang 
Institute. They offered alternative budgets, as well as critical feedback on a range of public policy 
issues. Furthermore, as noted earlier, opposition resistance to political financing reform predated the 
1MDB scandal. 
Opposition parties may also have had a short-term electoral stake in maintaining the existing system 
of political finance. Despite the daunting resource imbalances between the opposition parties and the 
BN, the opposition was able to make great electoral inroads, even into former BN strongholds, over 
the previous two elections. After the 2008 elections, BN lost control of the wealthy industrialised 
states of Penang and Selangor. Two of these highly urbanised states, Penang and Selangor, have a 
strong industrial base and a large middle class. Subsequently, DAP and PKR, in particular, obtained a 
reputation for being pro-business in the two states. According to one opposition legislator, these wins 
meant they were able to attract greater corporate donations as companies started “hedging,” by 
contributing to them as well as the BN (Interview, Kuala Lumpur, January 5, 2016). 
Public donations and contributions from sitting legislators appeared to constitute a substantial part of 
the budgets of opposition parties. However, the finances of opposition parties were dwarfed by the 
resources available to UMNO. Opposition parties relied on a variety of sources of political finance: 
donations, a portion of the salaries of sitting legislators, as well as fundraising at regularly-held 
ceramah (public forums) and dinners (Gomez 2012, 1383–1384; Weiss 2016, 84–85). Given that the 
opposition parties could potentially pave a path to victory under the existing system, the short-term 
incentives for them to alter the rules of the game were lower. On the campaign trail and in 
conversations with the press, opposition parties largely highlighted the personal corruption linked 
with the 1MDB funds and the alleged lavish spending on private goods by Najib and his family. Yet, 
they remarked less on the larger rationale given by Najib: the political donation that went into 
financing the UMNO campaign during the 2013 elections (Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the shifting of the political finance debate in Malaysia through an 
increasingly contentious political environment. Prior to the 2008 elections, opposition parties had 
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actively supported civil society endeavours to reform the financing of politics, most evident in the 
first Bersih campaign in 2007. However, after securing control of key state governments in the 2008 
election, the views of most opposition parties on political financing, specifically the need for 
disclosure of the sources of their funds, came to be remarkably similar to those of the dominant party, 
UMNO. Although the ruling and opposition coalitions publicly declared the need for political 
financing reforms, these parties failed to institute reforms at the national or state level. This reluctance 
to change the rules on political financing brought these parties into serious contestations with civil 
society actors who endeavoured to institute legislative and institutional reforms as well as 
mechanisms to curb money politics during elections within parties. 
Even in the wake of the 1MDB scandal, fundamental political finance reform appeared elusive. In the 
face of declining electoral support, UMNO and the BN coalition increasingly relied on unregulated 
political finance even as it severely undermined the government’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, the 
1MDB scandal reverberated in ruling party politics. The issues surrounding 1MDB and the prime 
minister’s slush fund destabilised UMNO, contributing to serious intra-elite feuding. This feud 
culminated in a formidable new opposition party led by former Prime Minister Mahathir. 
At the same time, opposition parties similarly relied on unregulated funding as a means to secure 
sufficient funds to mount an effective campaign to unseat the long-ruling BN. Had the government-
led Consultative Committee proposals in the form of the PDEA statute become law, it may have 
served to entrench the ruling party’s hegemony. The new law would have provided ample ground to 
be selectively applied to the opposition, undermining their activities among the electorate. Yet, the 
opposition also had a greater stake in the current system, as their state-level wins in 2008 and 2013 
afforded them more access to funds that were previously only available to UMNO and its BN 
partners. Judging from the actions of the opposition, they had more reason to support the status quo in 
the form of unregulated political finance, which provided space for them to raise funds even as it 
systematically disadvantaged them compared to the ruling party. 
While civil society activists played a significant role in the evolving debate, they largely found 
themselves on the other side from both the opposition and BN on the issue of political finance reform. 
They remained conflicted over the extent to which they could steer potential reforms in ways that did 
not simply entrench the ruling government’s power and potentially undermine the opposition while 
recognising the imperative need for regulation to political financing to ensure transparency and 
accountability in governance and policy planning and implementation. However, in the long term, if 
meaningful reforms are not instituted, it is quite likely that the contestations between political parties 
and civil society will persist. 
Comparing Malaysia with the dominant party authoritarian regimes in Mexico and Singapore suggests 
two different paths that political finance reform may take. Prior to the 2018 elections, it appeared that 
Malaysia’s political finance reforms would be closer to those in Singapore, where new political 
finance laws served to entrench the ruling party’s hegemony. The debate over political finance reform 
in Malaysia took on a sharper and even more politicised character after 2015 with a focus on money 
politics within parties, seen in the proposals by civil society. And yet, as the increasingly embattled 
prime minister faced an impending general election that would provide a clearer signal of his 
standing, he likely relied on channelling funds to key supporters and voters at a level higher than ever. 
At the same time, there was legitimate fear by the opposition that these new regulations would be 
selectively applied. 
The case of political finance discussed in this article demonstrates how continued resistance, 
particularly from the ruling party, can halt reform even in the face of serious political crises. Yet, in 
showing the conflicting incentives and behaviour of opposition parties and civil society, it also shows 
that the behaviour of other actors in electoral authoritarian regimes matters for understanding how 
policy debates unfold. These interactions between civil society, opposition parties and the ruling party 
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have been key to “protracted transitions” to democracy, where decades of contestation and bargaining 
eventually pave the way for democratisation (Eisenstadt 2007). While increasing regulation may very 
well have continued to favour the BN, over the long term it may have laid the basis for further 
negotiation between key actors in the struggle for Malaysia’s democracy. The long-term trajectory of 
these interactions depends, in large part, on whether actors from all sides accept the necessity for 
regulation of the country’s political finance regime. 
 
Postscript 
In Malaysia’s 14th General Election held in May 2018, the Pakatan Harapan (PH, or Alliance of 
Hope) coalition of opposition parties unseated UMNO and its coalition BN government from power. 
For the first time, a change of government had occurred and UMNO was not the hegemonic party in a 
governing coalition. However, Mahathir, who had served as UMNO president between 1981 and 
2003, returned to power as prime minister, along with ex-party allies, suggesting that while a 
significant change had occurred, some things remained the same. Indeed, the three most powerful 
actors in government now were Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim, designated as the prime minister-in-
waiting – he is scheduled to take over in two years – and economic advisor, Daim Zainuddin. These 
three men, all once in UMNO, were the most powerful members of government in the early 1990s, 
before Anwar’s ouster from the party in 1998 which led to the emergence of the reformasi (reform) 
movement that sought to undo the centralisation of economic and political power in the office of the 
executive that had occurred during Mahathir’ long rule (see Weiss 2005). In one of the great ironies of 
the May 2018 election, Mahathir had emerged as the politician who could potentially institute many 
of the reforms that had been articulated by this movement. 
UMNO’s fall introduced an interesting twist to the dynamics of political finance reform in Malaysia. 
The issues raised in this article, accepted for publication prior to the May 2018 election, have been 
brought into new relief as PH enters its first year in power. This brief postscript reviews the 
implications and potential trajectories of political financing reform after incumbent turnover. 
One core reason for UMNO’s unprecedented electoral defeat was the disastrous consequence of the 
1MBD scandal on the public image of the government and Prime Minister Najib. Although Najib had 
initially consolidated power within UMNO by ousting his critics and shutting down criminal 
investigations into 1MDB, a GLC, the scandal ultimately precipitated a serious split within party 
ranks. This feud led to the emergence of a breakaway party led by a formidable team of ex-UMNO 
leaders, including Najib’s mentor, former Prime Minister Mahathir, as well as former Deputy Prime 
Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and supported by a large group of prominent retired UMNO leaders. This 
party combined forces with PKR, led by former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar. A new opposition 
coalition was forged between these parties, as well as the DAP, which had strong electoral support 
among the urban non-Malay electorate. 
After the resulting alliance of strange bedfellows in PH had won power, Mahathir was named prime 
minister with responsibility for fulfilling the manifesto pledges these parties had made but likely not 
expected to be able to institute. The reform mandate of the new government constituted a long list of 
hoped-for changes of the country’s political and economic institutions. Mahathir stated that political 
financing reforms were imperative, though specifically to curb corruption (New Straits Times, July 9, 
2018). A critical issue moving forward was whether the new government would introduce legislation 
that offered greater disclosure of sources of party funding and restrictions on the deployment of 
money in Malaysia’s electoral process and party elections. 
PH’s electoral victory transpired despite the continuing resource imbalance between this coalition and 
the ruling BN government. Unlike other paradigmatic cases of incumbent turnover, such as Mexico’s 
PRI loss in presidential elections in 2000, neither a significant loss of state resources nor a levelling of 
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the playing field was instrumental in the opposition winning power. In the lead-up to the 2018 
elections, although the opposition parties increasingly benefited from unregulated sources of finance, 
the BN had access to far more monetary resources, including from GLCs (see Gomez et al. 2017). 
The GLCs that were supposed to be playing a role in helping the Malays, UMNO’s primary support 
base, had been exposed before the election as being involved in serious corruption. This included 
major GLCs such as the plantations-based FELDA, MARA, the institution created to uplift poor 
Malays, the pilgrimage-centred Tabung Haji and LTAT, the armed forces investment fund. As the 
new governing coalition, Mahathir and his allies inherited limited and loosely enforced policies and 
regulations that serve to keep the PH parties well-funded as they seek to consolidate their position in 
government. PH, after all, secured only about 48% of the popular vote in the general election. 
In its election manifesto, the PH coalition pledged its commitment to introduce a Political Financing 
Control Act within its first year of administration. The main principles of this Act would include 
annual state funding for qualifying political parties, a limit on the total worth of assets held by 
political parties, the end to anonymous political donations, the outlawing of political donations by 
GLCs and the submission of audited annual financial reports by political parties (Pakatan Harapan 
2018). Implementation of these principles would pave the way forward to curtailing the excesses of 
unregulated political donations and spending by the state and political parties that had marked 
Malaysian politics in decades prior. One specific demand made by civil society that was not included 
in the manifesto was public oversight of intra-party elections, specifically through the Election 
Commission. After all, the abuse of money during party elections had emerged as an issue in not just 
UMNO but also other parties in the BN and PH. 
Six months after coming into power, the government had made no firm commitments on moving 
forward on its new law. TI-Malaysia and Bersih both released statements in June of 2018 calling on 
the government to fulfil its promises in its manifesto around political finance reform and translate 
them into legislation (Free Malaysia Today, June 1, 2018). In October 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir 
stated that the PH’s finances were “in a critical situation” (The Malay Mail,October 5, 2018). In his 
comments, he seemed to qualify PH’s pledge to pursue state financing of political parties, indicating 
that the mechanism by which parties would be funded under possible new legislation was not settled 
(The Malay Mail,October 5, 2018). 
In the meantime, reforms into the system of GLCs, which the PH manifesto pledged would be 
required to fulfil the OECD’s corporate governance rules on state-owned companies, remain ongoing. 
The PH government also began unrolling limited declarations of assets by cabinet ministers and 
members of parliament (although not state-level legislators) on the website of the MACC. 
The PH government, however, has begun to address some of the political finance and corruption 
scandals that emerged in the previous administration. Corruption charges have been levelled against 
the current and former presidents of UMNO, Zahid Hamidi and Najib respectively, as well as party 
vice president and former minister Mahdzir Khalid, with more likely to come. Mahathir stated that 
“thousands” of graft cases from the Najib administration, mostly involving UMNO, remain to be 
investigated. Recent revelations of the role of the state sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah and Bank 
Negara, the Central Bank, in servicing 1MDB debt show that the untangling of corruption cases will 
continue over the short term. 
Yet, these scandals can recur under the new administration unless further regulations are introduced. 
For example, the October 2018 internal election of PKR, a member of the PH coalition, was marred 
by allegations of money politics, including vote buying of individual voters and at the district level 
(The Sun, October 18, 2018). This suggested that the PH parties may face challenges in promoting 
intra-party democracy through greater transparency in the conduct of party elections, a core demand 
by civil society in its demands for reform of political financing. Hearkening back to UMNO’s policy 
of keeping money politics out of public scrutiny, Finance Minister and deputy coalition president Lim 
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Guan Eng declared that the PH would not interfere with PKR’s party affairs and that the party should 
handle the matter internally. 
UMNO’s fall from power served as an opportunity for it to institute internal reforms, including to 
cease its debilitating practice of patronage and money distribution during party elections. This did not 
occur during the UMNO election that was held in June 2018. During this election, again fraught with 
serious allegations of money politics, UMNO warlords were re-elected to office while Zahid was 
elected president. Although Zahid was expected to be charged for corruption, this did not deter 
UMNO members from electing him even though he was challenged by two credible candidates, thus 
losing the opportunity to select more appealing leaders (Malaysiakini, July 1, 2018). UMNO has since 
shown little or no effort to institute internal reforms, including the curbing of monetised politics and 
to reconstitute itself as a credible opposition party. 
Meanwhile, PH’s handling of core issues, such as the introduction of a well-constituted Political 
Financing Control Act, the devolution of power to key oversight agencies such as the Election 
Commission, the MACC and the Attorney General’s Chamber and reform of the GLCs, will be 
critical if the next Malaysian general election, which must be held by 2023, is governed by a reformed 
set of political finance regulations. It will be part of the broader test as to whether elections are held 
on a more genuinely level playing field and if Malaysia is to undergo a transition to full electoral 
democracy. 
Arguably, the current strength of the ruling PH coalition in both national and state governments offers 
it the political space to implement its manifesto pledges without fear that these reforms will endanger 
its political position in the next elections. The current disarray of the opposition has removed UMNO, 
one significant political actor, from opposing reforms. However, what is also occurring is the hopping 
of UMNO parliamentarians and state assemblymen into PH parties, specifically those now led by ex-
UMNO leaders. Some may hope that this move could help protect them from corruption 
investigations. By accepting these party-hoppers as members, these parties can strengthen their 
position in the PH coalition. Thus, it remains to be seen whether civil society actors, operating in a 
less constrained political environment, will provide the key impetus for pushing forward genuine 
political finance reforms. 
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Notes 
1. In this election, opposition parties won, for the first time in history, control of five of the 13 state 
governments. BN also lost the popular vote in the peninsula but retained power because of the support 
it obtained in the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak (Case 2009). 
2. In spite of this, in the 2013 election, the opposition secured 50.87% of the popular vote, but failed 
to secure power only because of extensive gerrymandering and the malapportionment of seats. BN 
secured only 45.74% of the popular vote in the peninsula. Nationwide, BN’s popular vote was a mere 
47.38% (Saravanamuttu 2016). BN returned to power only because it had secured a simple majority in 
parliament, an outcome attributed to gerrymandering and the malapportionment of seats (see Ostwald 
2013). 
3. For a review of the debates in the 2008 elections involving the issue of money politics, patronage 
and cronyism, see Saravanamuttu and Maznah (2019) and Saravanamuttu (2016). 
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4. A deeper analysis of this form of monetised politics, practiced within UMNO, is dealt with in 
greater depth by Saravanamuttu and Maznah (2019). 
5. The description in this paragraph is drawn from the author’s observations during the meetings. 
6. There was an important reason why no member of the Backbencher’s Club joined the minister for 
this meeting. The chairman of the Backbencher’s Club at that time was then deeply implicated in a 
major controversy involving the construction of a multi-billion ringgit industrial area, the Port Klang 
Free Zone scandal. For a comprehensive review of this scandal see Lee and Lee (2012). 
7. Nazir contended that he thought that this money had come from donations he had helped solicit 
from Malaysian companies and individuals (Reuters, May 18, 2016). 
8. Press statement by Najib Razak, Prime Minister’s Office, August 14, 2015. 
9. Paul Low’s radio interview about the work on this matter can be heard at: 
https://www.bfm.my/breakfast-grille-yb-senator-datuk-paul-low.html. 
10. For the full set of political reform recommendations by these NGOs, see: 
https://media.wix.com/ugd/471d06_40104a0273ce4400a326e1b7b8039de0.pdf. 
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